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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from the Order of the Fourth Judicial
District Court for Utah County, the Honorable Boyd L. Park,
granting the State's Motion to Dismiss pursuant to the
"incarceration exception" of Section 63-30-10(1)(j) of the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act (hereafter "UGIA").

This Court has

jurisdiction over plaintiff's appeal pursuant to Section
78-2-2(3)(i) of the Utah Code and Rule 4(a) of the Rules of the
Utah Supreme Court.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Since this is appeal of an Order granting the State's
Motion to Dismiss, the allegations of appellant's Verified
Complaint are not disputed.

Most of the facts set forth by

appellant (hereafter "Kirk") in his Brief are immaterial to the
legal issues before this Court on appeal.

The undisputed

material facts are as follows:
1.

At the time respondent State of Utah (hereafter

"State") transported Ronnie Lee Gardner (hereafter "Gardner")
to the Metropolitan Hall of Justice at Salt Lake City he "was
. . . incarcerated at the Utah State Prison."

Plaintiff's

Verified Complaint at 1f 9, a copy of which is attached hereto
as Appendix I.

2.

Gardner was in the company of two Utah State Prison

guards during transport.

See Brief of Appellant, Statement of

Facts, at 11 3.
3.

After entering the Metropolitan Hall of Justice accom-

panied by the two armed guards, Gardner was passed a handgun by
an accomplice, and thereafter shot Kirk.

Plaintiff's Verified

Complaint, supra, at 1f 7.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
By Kirk's own allegation, when the State transported
Gardner from the prison to the courthouse he was "incarcerated."

Kirk also alleges that the State was negligent in the

manner in which it transported Gardner.

Thus, by Kirk's own

allegations, his injury arose out of Gardner's incarceration
and the UGIA expressly and unambiguously preserves the State's
immunity from suit for injury which "arises out of the incarceration of any person in any state prison . . . or other place
of legal confinement."

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1)(j) (1953,

as amended).
The State did not waive application of this immunity
provision by purchasing insurance coverage.

Immunity granted

by the UGIA remains unless expressly waived, and no provision
of the UGIA waives immunity upon purchase of insurance coverage.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
KIRK'S CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE
INCARCERATION EXCEPTION OF THE UTAH
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT.
The UGIA codifies the common law principal that a governmental entity is immune from suit except where it consents to
be sued and establishes a three-step test for determining
whether immunity exists:
(1) The first step is to determine whether the activity
out of which injury arises is "a governmental function."
Code Ann. § 63-30-3.

If so, immunity exists.

Utah

Kirk does not

contend, nor can it reasonably be argued that the transport of
Gardner from the prison to the courthouse is not a uniquely
governmental function.

See Epting v. State, 546 P.2d 242, 244

(Utah 1976) and Sheffield v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 314, 445 P.2d
367, 368 (1968).
(2)

Step two is to determine whether immunity is waived by

the Act for the particular governmental function in question.
While Kirk's Complaint makes no specific reference to a waiver
of immunity provision, it is presumed that he relies on Section
63-30-10(1), which waives immunity for "injury proximately
caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed
within the scope of his employment."
§ 63-30-10(1).

-3-

Utah Code Ann.

It will be presumed for the purposes of this portion of the
argument only that the waiver of Section 63-30-10(1) applies.
The State argues elsewhere, however, that there is no duty
running from it to Kirk and, therefore, as a matter of law
there can be no negligence.
(3)

See "ARGUMENT," POINT III, infra.

The third step is to determine whether the waiver of

immunity is subject to any exception.

Section 63-30-10(1)

lists several distinct exceptions to the general waiver of
immunity for employee negligence.

These exceptions are listed

in the alternative rather than conjunctive, and thus only one
need apply to void the waiver.

The waiver and the exception

applicable here are as follows:
(1) Immunity from suit of all government entities is
waived for injury proximately caused by a negligent
act or omission of an employee committed within the
scope of employment except if the injury:

(j) arises out of the incarceration of any
person in any state prison, county or city jail or
other place of legal confinement. . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1)(j).
A.

Kirk's Assailant Was Incarcerated At All Times
Pertinent to this Action

Plaintiff's Verified Complaint and the Statement of Facts
in his Brief on appeal make it clear that Gardner was an inmate
at the Utah State Prison, being held on a charge of first
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degree murder for an incident which had occurred some months
before.

It is undisputed that at the time of the shooting in

question, Gardner had been transported from the prison to the
courthouse to be formally arraigned on the murder charge.
Under the facts of this case it cannot reasonably be argued
that Gardner was not still "incarcerated" when he reached the
courthouse.
In Madsen v. State, 583 P.2d 92 (Utah 1978), the Utah
Supreme Court held that an injury caused by an inmate who was
"under the control of prison officials" was barred by the
incarceration exception of Section 63-30-10(1)(j).

The Court

defined incarceration as being "in prison" or "under the
control of the State."

Id. at 93.

Even Justice Maughan's

dissent in Epting v. State, supra, upon which appellant relies
in his Brief, states that the statutory provision in question
would apply whether the inmate was "incarcerated . . . in the
prison, or under the direct control of the state."

546 P.2d at

246 (emphasis added).
It is clear that Gardner, who was chained, handcuffed, and
in leg irons, and who was accompanied by two uniformed prison
guards carrying service revolvers, remained "under the control
of the state."

See, e.g., Emery v. State, 26 Utah 2d 1, 483

P.2d 1296, 1297 (Utah 1971) (where the Court interpreted the
words "other place of legal confinement" to include any place
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"where one cannot be released without some kind of permission").
Indeed, Kirk's Verified Complaint acknowledges that Gardner was
incarcerated "at the time" the prison guards transported him to
the Metropolitan Hall of Justice.

Gardner was still under the

control of those guards when the escape ensued and was still
"incarcerated" when the State's alleged negligence occurred.
B.

Kirk's Injury Arose Out of Gardner's Incarceration

Kirk also argues that, even assuming Gardner's
"incarceration," Kirk's injury did not "arise out of" the
incarceration.

The case authority cited by Kirk in his Brief,

however, makes it clear that the term "arises out of" as found
in Section 63-30-10(1)(j), is interpreted broadly, and
encompass the facts of this case.
In his Memorandum filed below in opposition to respondent's
Motion to Dismiss, appellant quoted from Justice Maughan's opinion in National Farmer's Union Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Western Cas.
& Surety Co., 577 P.2d 961 (Utah 1978).
here:

The quote is helpful

"The term 'arising out of' is ordinarily understood to

mean originating from, incident to, or connected with the item
in question."

Id. at 963 (emphasis added).

The Utah Supreme

Court also applied this definition to the incarceration
exception in Madsen v. State, supra.
In Madsen, the wife and daughter of a Utah State Prison
inmate who had died following surgery in the prison hospital
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filed a wrongful death action against the prison and selected
prison employees.

The Court recognized that the inmate while

not incarcerated in the prison, was confined to the hospital at
the prison and concluded that the inmate's death "arose out of"
incarceration and that "since this injury occurred while Madsen
was under the control of prison officials, the governmental
entities, vis., the State of Utah and the Board of Corrections,
are both immune from liability."

Ld. (emphasis added).

Madsen

reaffirms the Court's earlier rule announced in Emery v. State,
supra, and Epting v. State, supra, that a prisoner's status and
the state's control over the prisoner, rather than the prisoner's physical location, are the critical factors respecting
application of the incarceration exception.
In the present case, the inmate Ronnie Lee Gardner was
chained and shackled, under the control of two uniformed prison
guards armed with service revolvers, being transported to a
District Court arraignment, when he tried to escape, injuring
appellant in the process.

In Epting v. State, supra, the

assailant was an inmate on prison "work release," working a job
outside the prison during the day.

He walked away from the job

and shortly thereafter murdered the claimants' mother.

The

inmate in Epting was not shackled or chained and was not accompanied by armed prison guards, but rather was on a privileged
work release program outside the prison undertaking gainful
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employment.

Nevertheless, the Court in Epting concluded that

there were just two logical alternatives for consideration
under these circumstances:

either (a) the prisoner had totally

escaped the control of the prison and was thus acting on his
own; or (b) the prisoner was under the control of the prison
authorities so that his conduct arose out of his incarceration.

Epting, 546 P.2d at 244. Under the first alternative,

the prison could not be responsible for the prisoner's actions;
under the second alternative, the prison would be immune from
suit under the incarceration exception of the statute.

Id.

The same must hold true here.
The rationale of Epting also is persuasive in reputing
Kirk's argument that "there was no causal connection of the
incarceration of Gardner and the shooting of the plaintiff."
Brief of Appellant at 6-7.

If there is no causal connection

between the State's incarceration of Ronnie Lee Gardner and his
shooting of Kirk there can be no causal connection between the
State's alleged negligence and Kirk's injuries, and therefore
appellant's claims must fail.
Kirk cannot reasonably argue that no causal connection
exists between the State's incarceration of Gardner and his
injuries, while arguing that a causal connection does exist
between the State's negligence and his injuries.

Indeed, it is

the State's failure to insure incarceration in fact upon which
Kirk bases his negligence claim.
-8-

But for Gardner's incarceration, there would have been no
need for the State to transport him to the Metropolitan Hall of
Justice.

But for Gardner's incarceration there would have been

no prison guards, no chains, no shackles.

But for Gardner's

incarceration, there would have been no attempt to escape.

But

for Gardner's incarceration, appellant would have no justifiable reason to sue the State of Utah and its Department of
Corrections.
POINT II
THE STATE OF UTAH DID NOT WAIVE IMMUNITY BY
PURCHASING LIABILITY INSURANCE.
A.

Waivers of Immunity Must Be Expressly Stated in the
UGIA.

The UGIA is a codification of the common law principle of
sovereign immunity.

The Utah Supreme Court has stated suc-

cinctly that "the Act expressly provides for the continuance of
sovereign immunity."

Holt v, Utah State Road Comm'n, 30 Utah

2d 4, 511 P.2d at 1287. Accordingly, the UGIA states that
where a governmental entity is engaged in a "governmental
function," the entity is immune from suit for any injury
resulting therefrom, "except as may be otherwise provided in"
the Act.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3.

This language indicates legislative "intention that the act
be strictly applied to preserve sovereign immunity; and to

-9-

waive it only as clearly expressed therein."
1288 (footnote omitted).

Holt/ 511 P.2d at

Thus, a governmental entity is immune

"unless immunity is expressly waived in one of the succeeding
sections of the . . . Act."

Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627,

631 (Utah 1983) (emphasis added).
Where a statute's meaning is plain from the words and
language chosen by the Legislature, the courts must "assume
that each term in the statute was used advisedly . . . and that
each should be interpreted and applied according to its usually
accepted meaning."
(Utah 1982).

West Jordan v. Morrison, 656 P.2d 445, 446

This is precisely what the Utah Supreme Court has

done in the past with respect to the "except as may be otherwise provided" language of Section 63-30-3. Where no express
waiver of immunity is found, no waiver can be implied.
B.

The UGIA Contains No Express Waiver of Immunity for
Purchase of Insurance.

Kirk's Brief does not cite any section of the UGIA where
immunity is expressly waived by a governmental entity upon
purchase of insurance.

No such provision exists.

Rather, he

argues that the provision of the UGIA allowing a governmental
entity to purchase insurance, to join with other entities to
create a "reserve fund," or to create a fund of its own "to
protect [it] from any or all risks created by this chapter,"
see Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-26 and 28, implies such a waiver.
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However, the "risks created by this chapter" come only from the
express waivers of immunity found in the Act.

If immunity is

not waived, there is no "risk" to be insured against.

Thus, to

argue that obtaining insurance expands or defines the risk
simply does not follow.
Moreover, public policy requires that governmental entities
be entitled to rely on the unambiguous language of the UGIA in
planning for potential liability risks.

Were plaintiff's

argument adopted here, governmental entities would lose all
immunity simply by attempting to secure adequate protection
from injuries arising out of activities for which immunity has
expressly been waived.
POINT III
RESPONDENT OWED NO DUTY TO APPELLANT.
By direct argument in his Memorandum opposing the Motion to
Dismiss below, and by indirect argument in his Brief to this
Court, appellant seeks to have Qbray v. Malmberg, 26 Utah 2d
17, 484 P.2d 160 (1971), overruled.

See Brief of Appellant at

8-10; Memorandum in Opposition at 19.
adopts the "public duty" rule for Utah.

The Qbray decision
That rule requires

that plaintiff must show the breach of a duty owed to plaintiff
as an individual, and not merely the breach of an obligation
owed to the general public.

See also 18 McQuillan, The Law of

Municipal Corporations, § 53.046 at 165 (3rd Ed. 1971).
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The rule also requires that plaintiff must show that he had
a special relationship with defendants which would impose a
duty greater than the general duty owed by the defendants to
the public at large.
(10th Cir. 1983).

See Humann v. Wilson, 696 F.2d 783, 784

Obray has not been overruled or modified by

any Utah Supreme Court decision.

To the contrary, the public

duty rule of Obray was reaffirmed in 1984 by the Utah Supreme
Court in Christenson v. Hayward, 694 P.2d 612 (Utah 1984).
This general duty owed to the public at large may become a
special duty owed to an individual, only where the governmental
entity deals or acts directly with the injured party on an
individual basis.
therein.

See 18 McQuillan, supra, and cases cited

Such were the facts in Little v. Utah State Div. of

Family Serv., 667 P.2d 49 (Utah 1983), cited by plaintiff in
his Brief.

There, the Division of Family Services placed a

child in a foster home, assumed a specific duty to provide
proper care for that child, and then breached that specific
duty, causing injury to the child.
not the case here.

667 P.2d at 51-52.

That is

No such direct contact took place between

Kirk and the State; no special relationship was created; no
specific duty towards appellant was assumed.
Even where the state may assume voluntarily to perform
certain acts or functions, either by statute, regulation, or
otherwise, no liability or actionable duty is created absent a
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special relationship with the claimant.

See Davidson v. City

of Westminster, 32 Cal. 3d 197, 649 P.2d 894, 899, 185 Cal.
Rptr. 252 (1982) (the common theme running through cases in
which a special relationship, and thus an actionable duty, has
been found is the voluntary assumption by the public entity or
official of a specific duty toward the injured party); Dinsky
v. Town of Framingham, 386 Mass. 810, 438 N.E.2d 51, 56 (1982)
(application of majority rule that in absence of special duty
to plaintiff, different from duty owed to public at large, no
cause of action can be maintained against a government
entity).

Thus, Obray is still good law in Utah.

No duty

exists and therefore appellant has no cause of action,
precluding the necessity of applying Section 63-30-10(1)(j).
With regard to appellant's argument that a duty "should"
exist, this Court has not adopted Section 319 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, as appellant freely admits in
his Brief.

See Brief of Appellant at 9.

This is not an appro-

priate case for this Court to consider doing so.

Even if the

Restatement section cited were adopted here and a duty created
thereby upon which appellant could maintain an action, the
specific immunity provision of Section 63-30-10(1)(j), which by
its very language presumes that a duty exists, bars plaintiff's
claim.

Accordingly, this Court should not adopt Section 319 of

the Restatement where its adoption would be precedent setting
but have no legal effect.
-13-

POINT IV"
KIRK'S "MODERN TREND" ARGUMENT SHOULD BE
MADE TO THE LEGISLATURE, NOT THIS COURT.
This Court has held consistently that the courts of this
state are to give force and effect to statutory terms which are
deemed to have been used advisedly by the Legislature.
Jordan v. Morrison, 656 P.2d at 446.

West

See also Gord v. Salt

Lake City, 20 Utah 2d 138, 434 P.2d 449, 451 (1967).

"It is

not the duty of this Court to assess the wisdom of the
statutory scheme,"

Gord, 434 P.2d at 451.

Here, appellant

argues that this Court should adopt a "modern trend" which is
contrary to the clear statutory scheme set forth in the
incarceration exception of Section 63-30-10(1)(j).

See Brief

of Appellant at 8-10.
This Court must assume that the Legislature intended to
accomplish just what the incarceration exception does—extend
immunity to governmental entities in cases like the one at
bar.

This Court may not alter or skew application of clear

statutory language simply because it disagrees with the wisdom,
effectiveness, reasonableness or orderliness of the statute.
See Gord, 434 P.2d at 451.

The Court "has a duty to let [the

statute] operate as the legislature has provided," id.,
regardless of "trends" in other states or jurisdictions.
It should be noted that the "trend" states whose decisions
appellant has cited in his Brief are jurisdictions which have
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abrogated, abolished, altered, or never had a governmental
immunity statutory framework similar to Utah's.

The legal

theories, doctrine or statutory bases for these decisions,
then, are strikingly different than that before this Court
here.

See, for example, Spanel v. Mounds View Sch, Dist. No.

621, 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795 (1962) and Tyler v. State,
618 P.2d 1042, 1045 (Wyo. 1980).

Decisions of courts from

other jurisdictions which are based on statutes different from
those of Utah, are not controlling law in Utah.

See State v.

Atherton, 69 Utah 53, 252 P. 280 (1926).
Even the Utah cases cited by appellant in support of his
"modern trend" argument are not applicable here.

Neither Doe

v. Arguelles, 716 P.2d 279 (Utah 1985) nor Little v. Utah State
Div. of Fam. Serv., supra, deal with the incarceration exception of Section 63-30-10(1)(j) . Both dealt with the discretionary function exception of Section 63-30-l0(1)(a) , which is
not at issue here.

Furthermore, neither discussed or adopted

any "trend."
Neither can Standiford v. Salt Lake City, 605 P.2d 1230
(Utah 1980) be read to support a "trend" away from immunity for
governmental functions.

Standiford deals exclusively with the

creation of a workable standard to determine whether a
governmental entity's activities are an "exercise of
governmental function."
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, this Court should affirm
the lower court's judgment of dismissal with prejudice and on
the merits of appellant's Verified Complaint, and respondent
State of Utah respectfully requests that this Court do so.
DATED this //_ZT day of April, 1988.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

By
Allan L*-' La£s
Dennis C. FeTguson
Christopher C. Fuller
Attorneys for Respondent
State of Utah
SCMCCF158
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APPENDIX I

PAUL N. COTRO-MANES, #736
Attorney for Plaintiff
Suite 280, 311 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2377
Telephone: 531-1300
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
GEORGE "NICK" KIRK,
Plaintiff,

V E R I F I E D
C O M P L A I N T

vs.
THE STATE OF UTAH and its
subdivision, THE DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS,

Civil No.

1

/

"7

Judge^w>-^c^ v w

<'

/ > /

/ \

Defendants.
Plaintiff complains and alleges:
1.

That he is a resident and citizen of the

State of Utah and was at all times mentioned herein.
2.

That this action is brought pursuant to the

Utah Governmental Immunity Act, 63-30-1, et. seq., Utah Code
Annotated, 1953 as amended.
3.

That the plaintiff has properly and timely

filed his notice of claim with the State of Utah as provided
by 63-30-11, UCA, 1953 as amended, a copy of which is attached
hereto, made a part hereof and marked as Exhibit "A," to
which claim the defendants have failed, refused, and neglected
to respond.

^/ \j - ^ r \

4.

That the plaintiff has, with this complaint,

filed an undertaking as required by 63-30-19, UCA, 1953 as
amended, in the amount of $3 0 0.00.
5.

That the acts complained of herein occurred

while the defendants1 officers, agents and employees were
acting within the scope of their employment performing
ministerial acts and functions in a negligent or grossly
negligent manner evidencing a deliberate indifference to the
rights of the plaintiff, said ministerial acts consisting of
the transportation of one RONNIE LEE GARDNER to a court
hearing in Salt Lake City, Utah, as is more fully set forth
hereafter.
6.

That on or about the 2nd day of April 1985,

the plaintiff, by and through its officers, agents and
employees, acting within the scope of their employment and
pursuant to the mandates and requirements of Utah law and
Utah constitution, arranged for, planned and did transport
one RONNIE LEE GARDNER from the Utah State Prison at Draper,
Utah, to the Metropolitan Hall of Justice in Salt Lake City,
Utah, so that the said RONNIE LEE GARDNER could attend a
court hearing at which he was required to be in attendance.
7.

That due to the negligent or grossly negligent

manner or manner exhibiting a deliberate indifference to the
safety of the public, and in particular the plaintiff, and

the manner by which the said RONNIE LEE GARDNER was restrained,
transported, and guarded, the said RONNIE LEE GARDNER attempted
to escape from the Metropolitan Hall of Justice at Salt Lake
City, Utah, and in so doing, due to the negligent conduct of
the defendants1 officers, agents and employees, acquired a
deadly firearm and did shoot, among others, the plaintiff
causing him temporary and permanent injuries, pain, suffering,
permanent disfigurement, loss of work, income and other and
further damages, both mental and physical.
8,

That the plaintiff incurred medical and doctor's

expenses and charges in an amount as yet not fully ascertained
and which are still being incurred for which the plaintiff
is entitled to be reimbursed in such amount as may be proven
at the time of trial.
9.

That at the time that the -plra-i-rrfci^f by and

through its officers, agents and employees transported the
said RONNIE LEE GARDNER to the Metropolitan Hall of Justice
at Salt Lake City, Utah, the said RONNIE LEE GARDNER was
facing a capital murder charge arising out of an incident
which occurred during an earlier escape, and, further, was
incarcerated at the Utah State Prison for various homicide,
assault and other felony convictions, including escape.
That the said RONNIE LEE GARDNER had made other successful
escapes from the defendant and had made threats prior to the
2nd day of April 1985, that he would again escape.

That the

officers, agents and employees of the defendant, knew, or
should have known of the dangerous propensities of the said
RONNIE LEE GARDNER but that they negligently, or grossly
negligently, or with a deliberate indifference transported
the said RONNIE LEE GARDNER and guarded him in such a manner
that he attempted to escape from the Metropolitan Hall of
Justice.
10..

That the officers, agents and employees of

the defendant did negligently or grossly negligently or with
deliberate indifference train, instruct, counsel and direct
other agents and employees in the methods and manner of
restraint, transportation and guarding of persons being
transported and that as a direct and proximate cause thereof
the said RONNIE LEE GARDNER did attempt an escape as aforesaid.
That the acts of the defendants were ministerial acts and as
such are not subject to any claim of sovereign immunity.
11.

That as a direct and proximate cause of the

conduct of the defendants, acting through their officers,
agents and employees the plaintiff suffered the injuries and
losses set forth above.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays judgment as follows:
(1)

That the Court award to the plaintiff herein,

special damages in the sum of $25,000 or such other and
further sum as may be proven at the time of trial in this
matter;

(2)

That the Court award to the plaintiff herein,

general damages in the sum of $400,000 or such other and
further sum as may be proven at the time of trial in this
matter;
(3)

For such other and further relief as the

Court deems just in the premises, pre-judgment interest at
the legal rate set by the laws of the State of Utah, costs
and interest after judgment.

George /Nick" Kirk
Plaintiff's address:
5111 South 4460 West
Kearns, Utah 84118

^'PAUL N. COTRO-MANES
Attorney for Plaintiff
Suite 280, 311 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2377

STATE OF UTAH

)
:
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)

ss.

GEORGE "NICK" KIRK, being first duly sworn, deposes
and says that he is the plaintiff in the foregoing action,
that he has read the foregoing complaint and knows and
understands the contents thereof; that the same is true

of his own knowledge, except as to matters therein stated
on information and belief, and as to such matters he believes
them to be true.

—'

"7

vT-

^
M

Subscribed and sworn to before me this
January 1987.

/£

day of

Notary Public, residing at
Salt Lake City, Utah
My Commission Expires:

CLAIM AGAINST THE STATE OF UTAH
and its
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS *
its Warden, Officers
and Employees
STATE OF UTAH

)
:
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)

ss.

GEORGE "NICK" KIRK being duly sworn deposes and
says:
1.

That he is a resident and citizen of the State

of Utah and that he is over the age of 21 years and that this
.Claim is filed pursuant to 63-30-1, et. seq. , Utah Code Anno,,
1953 as amended.
2.

That on the 2nd day of April 1985, your affiant

was employed by the Sheriff of Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, as a bailiff assigned to the Third Judicial District
Court, County of Salt Lake, New Courts Building, Metropolitan
Hall of Justice, Salt Lake City, Utah.
3.

That on the 2nd day of April 19 85, pursuant to

the provisions of the Utah Constitution and the statutory
laws of the State of Utah, requiring the attendance of an
accused at court hearings involving him, the State of Utah
by and through its Department of Corrections, its officers,
agents, and employees, transported one RONNIE LEE GARDNER to
the Metropolitan Hall of Justice, New Courts Building, Salt
Lake City, Utah, for a court hearing arising out of certain
alleged criminal conduct of the said Ronnie Lee Gardner.

4.

That in so doing, the State of Utah by and

through its officers, agents, and employees were acting in a
ministerial capacity and subject to the provisions of the
Utah Governmental Immunity Act waiving immunity in such
situations.
5.

That the State of Utah by and through its

Department of Corrections, the Warden of the Utah State
Prison and his officers, agents, and employees, all employed
by the State of Utah, while they were then and there acting
in their official capacity and within the scope of their
authority and employment, negligently or willfully transported
the said Ronnie Lee Gardner in such a manner and/or under
such negligently or willfully applied restraints and/or the
omission to apply the same and/or with such negligent disregard
of watchfulness and caution normally associated with the
movement of such a person, that the said Ronnie Lee Gardner
obtained possession of a loaded firearm and did attempt to
escape from the Metropolitan Hall of Justice and in so doing
did grievously shoot and injure your affiant, George "Nick11
Kirk, without provocation, who, as a direct and proximate
cause of the negligent acts and omissions of the State of
Utah, its officers, agents, and employees, suffered permanent
disabling injury to his body, undergone pain, suffering,
surgery, loss of employment, incurred medical and hospital
expenses and has otherwise suffered with a resulting economic

loss of $ 25,000.00

for medical and hospital bills and

general damages in the sum of $ 400,000.00' so far as they
are known at this time.
6.

That at the time that the State of Utah by and

through its officers, agents, and employees transported the
said Ronnie Lee Gardner into the Metropolitan Hall of Justice,
New Courts Building, it and they well knew that the said
Ronnie Lee Gardner had on a previous occasion, a short time
prior to the 2nd day of April 1985, escaped from the custody
of the State of Utah, its Department of Corrections and the
officers, agents, and employees thereof; and further had
allegedly murdered a citizen of the State of Utah while on
escape; further, the said Ronnie Lee Gardner had announced
to the officers, agents, and employees of the State of Utah,
previous to April 2, 1985, his intent to attempt future
escapes.

Even though the said State of Utah by and through

its officers, agents, and employees knew of the dangerous
propensities of the said Ronnie Lee Gardner, it and they
took no precautionary measures, all ministerial in nature,
to protect the public and in particular your affiant, George
"Nick" Kirk, from the said Ronnie Lee Gardner.
7.

That this affidavit and claim are filed pursuant

to 63-30-11, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, and is
timely under the provisions of 63-30-12, Utah Code Annotated,
1953 as amended.

8.

All communications relative to this notice of

claim should be served upon my attorney, Paul N. CotroManes, Esq., Attorney at Law, Suite 280, 311 South State
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2377, telephone (801)
531-1300.

-^

/~£ZtS7>rW SsAz&C

/Mjnr-*&

GETORGE ^NICK'LKIRK
Subscribed and sworn to before me this \^0r£i

day

of January 1986.

Notary Public, residing^:
fait Lake County, Utah
My C o m m i s s i o n

Expires:

MY COMMISSION EXPIRES AUG. 21,1988
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AUL N. COTRO-MANES
Attorney for Affiant
George "Nick" Kirk
Suite 280, 311 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2377

APPENDIX

II

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
*********

GEORGE "Nick" KIRK,
:

Civil No. CV-87873

Plaintiff,
-vs-

RULING

STATE OF UTAH, et al.

:

BOYD L. PARK, JUDGE

Defendants.
*********

This matter came regularly before the court for hearing on
Thursday, August 13, 1987, on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
based upon sovereign immunity pursuant to 63-30-1 et seq.
Paul N. Cotro-Manes esq. represented Plaintiff.
C. Fuller esq. represented Defendants.

Christopher

The Court, having

heard oral arguments of counsel in the premises, having read
the Motion to Dismiss, the Memoranda in Support of the Motion,
and the Memoranda in Opposition to the Motion, makes the
following Findings and Ruling:
FINDINGS
1.

On April 2, 1985, during an escape attempt at the Salt
Lake Metropolitan Hall of Justice, prison inmate Ronnie
Lee Gardner shot bailiff George "Nick" Kirk, plaintiff
herein, in the stomach.

On January 12f 1987, Plaintiff filed this negligence action
against the State of Utah and the Utah State Department of
Corrections.
On February 9, 1987, defendants filed a motion to dismiss
this action based on the Utah Governmental Immunity Act,
63-30-1 et seq.
Section 63-30-3 of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act,
which expressly provides for the continuance of sovereign
immunity for any injury resulting from the exercise of a
governmental function "except as otherwise provided in this
chapter," indicates an intention that the act be strictly
applied to preserve sovereign immunity.

Holt v. Utah State

Road Commission, 30 Utah 2d 4, 511 P.2d 1286 (Utah 1973).
Section 63-30-2(4) of the Utah Sovereign Immunity Act
defines "Governmental function" as:
any act or failure to act, operation, function, or undertaking of a governmental entity whether or not the act
or failure to act, operation, function, or undertaking
is characterized as a governmental, proprietary, a core
governmental function, unique to government, undertaken
in a dual capacity, essential or not essential to a
government or government function, or could be performed
by private enterprise.
By delivering inmate Ronnie Lee Gardner to the court, the
defendant's employees were clearly engaged in a governmental
function within the meaning of 63-30-2(4) and the fact that

that such activity could be performed by private enterprise
does not alter that result.
7.

Section 63-30-10(1) expressly waives governmental immunity
from suit for injury proximately caused by a negligent act
or omission of an employee committed within the scope of his
authority except for certain enumerated exceptions.

8.

One exception expressly retains governmental immunity if the
injury "arises out of the incarceration of any person in any
state prison . . ."

Section 63-30-10(1)(j) U.C.A 1953, as

amended; previously numbered as 63-30-10(10).
9.

The plain meaning of that section reflects a legislative
intent to retain sovereign immunity for any injuries
occurring while the incarcerated person is in prison
and under the control of the state.

Madsen v. State,

583 P.2d 92f 93 (Utah 1978).
10. The fact that inmate Ronnie Lee Gardner was brought to
the Salt Lake Metropolitan Hall of Justice for court
proceedings does not change the fact that Gardner was
an inmate incarcerated at the Utah State Prison who
was under the control of the state.
11. The governmental entity is immune "unless immunity is
expressly waived in one of the succeeding sections of

the .

.

. Act,"

Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627,

631 (Utah 1983)(emphasis added), and a waiver of that
immunity cannot be implied solely by the fact a state
has chosen to purchase insurance coverage.
12. This court recognizes that sovereign immunity is a harsh
doctrine which effectively deprives the plaintiff of his
remedy for actual injuries suffered.

The court further

acknowledges that, while several states are currently
restricting sovereign immunity, the State of Utah seems
to be reinforcing sovereign imminity.

However, this

court is not the appropriate forum to change the policy
of the Utah State Legislature nor the rulings of the Utah
Supreme Court.
RULING
1.

Defendant's are immune from this suit pursuant to Section
63-30-10(1)(j) of the Utah State Governmental Immunity Act,

2.

Defendants1 Motion to Dismiss this action is granted.

Dated this 4th day of November, 1987.
BY THE COURT

BOYD L. PARK,^DISTRICT JUDGE
c c : Paul N. Cotro-Manes e s q .
C h r i s t o p h e r C. F u l l e r e s q .
Brent A. Burnett, esq.

ALLAN L. LARSON
JODY K BURNETT
CHRISTOPHER C. FULLER
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Co-Counsel for Defendants
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
GEORGE "NICK" KIRK,
Plaintiff,

ORDER AND JUDGMENT

vs.
THE STATE OF UTAH and its
subdivision, THE DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS,

Civil No. CV-87873
(Formerly Third District
Court Civil No. C-87-00198)

Defendants.
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, based upon sovereign immunity
pursuant to Section 63-30-1, ejt seq. , Utah Code Annotated, 1953
as amended, came on for oral argument before the above-referenced
Court on Thursday, August 13, 1987, with Paul N. Cotro-Manes
representing plaintiff, and Christopher C. Fuller of Snow, Christensen & Martineau representing defendants.

The Court, having heard

oral arguments of counsel, having read the Motion to Dismiss, the
memoranda in support of the Motion, and the memoranda in opposition
to the Motion, the Court having issued a Ruling on the Motion on
November 4, 1987, being fully advised in the premises, the Court
finds and concludes as follows:

1.

On April 2, 1985, during an escape attempt at the Salt

Lake Metropolitan Hall of Justice, prison inmate Ronnie Lee
Gardner shot bailiff George "Nick" Kirk, plaintiff herein, in
the stomach•
2.

On January 12, 1987, plaintiff filed this negligence

action against the State of Utah and the Utah State Department of
Corrections.
3.

On February 9, 1987, defendants filed a motion to dismiss

this action based on the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, 63-30-1,
et seg.
4.

Section 63-30-3 of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act,

which expressly provides for the continuance of sovereign immunity
for any injury resulting from the exercise of a governmental function "except as otherwise provided in this chapter," indicates an
intention that the act be strictly applied to preserve sovereign
immunity.

Holt v. Utah State Road Commission, 30 Utah 2d 4, 511

P.2d 1286 (Utah 1973).
5.

Section 63-30-2(4) of the Utah Sovereign Immunity Act

defines "Governmental function" as:
any act or failure to act, operation, function, or undertaking of a governmental entity whether or not the act
or failure to act, operation, function, or undertaking
is characterized as a governmental, proprietary, a core
governmental function, unique to government, undertaken
in a dual capacity, essential or not essential to a
government or government function, or could be performed
by private enterprise.
6.

By delivering inmate Ronnie Lee Gardner to the court, the

defendant's employees were clearly engaged in a governmental function within the meaning of 63-30-2(4) and the fact that such activity
-9-

could be performed by private enterprise does not alter that result.
7.

Section 63-30-10(1) expressly waives governmental immunity

from suit or injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed within the scope of his authority
except for certain enumerated exceptions.
8.

One exception expressly retains governmental immunity if

the injury "arises out of the incarceration of any person in any
state prison . . ."

Section 63-30-10(1)(j) U.C.A. 1953, as amended;

previously numbered as 63-30-10(10).
9.

The plain meaning of that section reflects a legislative

intent to retain sovereign immunity for any injuries occurring
while the incarcerated person is in prison and under the control
of the state. Madsen v. State, 583 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1978).
10.

The fact that inmate Ronnie Lee Gardner was brought to

the Salt Lake Metropolitan Hall of Justice for court proceedings
does not change the fact that Gardner was an inmate incarcerated
at the Utah State Prison who was under the control of the state.
11.

The governmental entity is immune "unless immunity is

expressly waived in one of the succeeding sections of the . . .
Act," Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627, 631 (Utah 1983) (emphasis
added), and a waiver of that immunity cannot be implied solely
by the fact a state has chosen to purchase insurance coverage.
12.

This court recognizes that sovereign immunity is a harsh

doctrine which effectively deprives the plaintiff of his remedy
for actual injuries suffered.

The court further acknowledges that,

while several states are currently restricting sovereign immunity,

the State of Utah seems to be reinforcing sovereign immunity.
However, this court is not the appropriate forum to change the
policy of the Utah State Legislature nor the rulings of the Utah
Supreme Court.
WHEREFORE, based upon the above-listed findings, the Court
concludes and rules that defendants are immune from this suit pursuant to Section 63-30-10 (1) (j) of the Utah Governmental Immunity
Act, and accordingly, defendants1 Motion to Dismiss should be
granted.
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that, based
upon the above-listed findings and conclusions, defendants are
immune from suit in this action and plaintiff's Complaint is
barred pursuant to Section 63-30-10 (1) (j) of the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act, and plaintiff's Complaint should be, and hereby is,
dismissed with prejudice and on the merits, no cause of action.
Each party to bear its own costs herein.
DATED this

day of November, 1987.
BY THE COURT:

Boyd L. Park, Fourth Judicial
District Court Judge
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STATE OF UTAH

)
)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

ss.

)

MARIE B. VAN WENSVEEN, being duly sworn, says:
That she is employed in the law offices of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, attorneys for

Defendants

herein; that she served the attached Order and Judgment

(Case Number

CV-87873

,

Utah

County)

upon the parties listed below by placing a true and correct copy
thereof in an envelope addressed to:
Paul N. Cotro-Manes
Attorney for Plaintiff
Suite 280, 311 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid,
on the /fijfck

day of

November

, 1987.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this /Ctir
November

day of

, 19B7.

3>
Notary Public
P^^-irHnc in the State of Utah

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I served the foregoing Brief of
Respondent by mailing four copies to Paul N. Cotro-Manes, Esq.,
Attorney for Appellant, at 311 South State Street, Suite 280,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this 11th day of April, 1988.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Christopher (SL. Duller
Attorneys for Respondent,

